Since the Judiciary Act of 1789,1 Congress has enacted statutes that grant federal courts jurisdiction over civil actions removed from state court. 2 These statutes empower federal courts to hear "Cases" 3 removed from state court the subject matter of which are encompassed within Congress's limited grants of jurisdiction, usually cases "arising under" federal law or cases within diversity jurisdiction. 4 (1982) ("The character of the controversies over which federal judicial authority may extend are delineated in Art. III, § 2, cl. 1."). But see National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 600 (1949) (three-justice plurality holding that Congress under article I may give justiciable controversies otherwise outside of article III to federal courts, "regardless of lack of diversity of citizenship"). By defining the authority of the lower federal courts it creates, Congress may restrict jurisdiction more narrowly than does article III. See Insurance Corp. of lr., 456 U.S. at 701 ("Jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is further limited to those subjects encompassed within a statutory grant of jurisdiction.").
' See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties . . ").
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982) . This provision states: Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the state in which such action is brought. Id. Since the first removal statute, see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79, statutes have provided for removal on the grounds of diversity of citizenship only to parties who were not residents of the state where the suit was brought. This restriction to nonresident defendants has appeared in every provision for diversity removal juris-(583) the federal courts, removal jurisdiction can extend, just as original jurisdiction can extend, to a case that includes a state law claim closely related to a federal law claim but that otherwise is not within the court's statutory jurisdiction. ' The boundaries of statutory removal jurisdiction and judicially-defined power over cases appear not wholly congruent. This divide has caused conflict in defining the scope of federal judicial power over cases removed from state court. 6 Consider, for example, a case initiated in state court that contains transactionally-related claims arising under both federal and state law and that the defendant properly removes to federal court. Section 1441(b) of the Judicial Code 7 grants the district court jurisdiction over the federal law claim. Common law jurisdiction attaches to the state law claim because it and the federal law claim derive from a "common nucleus of operative fact." 8 After removal, the court dismisses the federal law claim, and the district court judge decides that the state law claim, although still within the court's incidental jurisdiction,' should diction except one. The exception is the Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. For the text of the 1875 statute, see infra note 156. The Judiciary Act of 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, corrected by Judiciary Act of 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433, again limited removal to nonresident defendants. Therefore, with the exception of references pertaining to the 1875 Act, any reference in this Comment to a party removing a diversity case to federal court, whether to a plaintiff or to a defendant, should be understood to mean a nonresident party.
I See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court refers to such a state law claim as a "nonfederal claim": "[T]he term 'nonfederal claim' means one as to which there is no independent basis for federal jurisdiction. Conversely, a 'federal claim' means one as to which an independent basis for federal jurisdiction exists." Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 n.11 (1978) . A nonfederal claim can be a state law claim between co-citizens that is closely related to a claim between diverse citizens or a state law claim that is closely related to a claim arising under federal law. See infra note 9.
8 For discussion of the conflict in defining the scope of federal judicial power over cases in a court's original jurisdiction, see infra notes 31-66 and accompanying text.
7 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982) . For the text of the statute, see supra note 4. 8 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) . For discussion of the statutory limits on the exercise of common law jurisdiction over state law claims, see infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
' This Comment will use the term "incidental" jurisdiction instead of the traditional terms "pendent" and "ancillary" jurisdiction. Using the Supreme Court's current terminology, this hypothetical state law claim is within the court's pendent jurisdiction. Pendent jurisdiction "concerns the resolution of a plaintiff's federal-and state-law claims against a single defendant in one action." Kroger, 437 U.S. at 370. Ancillary jurisdiction, by comparison, "typically involves claims by a defending party haled into court against his will, or by another person whose rights might be irretrievably lost unless he could assert them in an ongoing action in a federal court." Id. at 376. The exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over nonfederal claims often has been upheld in situations involving impleader, cross-claims, or counterclaims. See id. at 375. Both pendent and ancillary jurisdiction are judicial doctrines that permit a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over a party or claim normally not within the scope of federal judicial power. See Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case": Procedural Rules [Vol. 136:583 remand a case that was properly removed, but that in its present posture contains only state law claims, is a question that divides the courts of appeals,'" a conflict that the Supreme Court has agreed to resolve. 4 This Comment will assess two views of jurisdictional authority-one based strictly on statute, the other relying on a claim of residual power to fashion common law-that conflict in defining the power to remand a properly removed case. Part I introduces the statutory bases for removal jurisdiction and examines the expansion of its scope through the development of incidental jurisdiction. It then sets forth the conflict between a federal court's statutorily-defined power to remand cases and its common law power over incidental state law claims. Part II explores judicial power to decline vested jurisdiction, as 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982) . Claims that derive from a "common nucleus of operative fact," Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, are not "separate and independent" for the purposes of § 1441(c). See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951) (holding that "where there is a single wrong to plaintiff . . . arising from an interlocked series of transactions, there is no separate and independent claim or cause of action under § 1441(c)").
Federal jurisdiction over state law claims under § 1441(c) is another example of a district court's incidental jurisdiction. See supra note 9. Along with pendent and ancillary claims, such claims are a third species of the "generic problem" that the Supreme Court identified in Kroger: "Under what circumstances may a federal court hear and decide a state-law claim arising between citizens of the same state?" Kroger, 437 U.S. at 370. State law claims under § 1441(c), however, cannot formally be classified as either pendent or ancillary. As noted above, a pendent claim as defined in Gibbs cannot be "separate and independent" from an otherwise removable claim. Nor can a state law claim that a plaintiff joins with a federally cognizable claim satisfy the Supreme Court's analysis of ancillary jurisdiction. See supra note 9. For further discussion of federal jurisdiction over state law claims under § 1441(c), see infra notes 140-55 and accompanying text. Ct. 1283 Ct. (1987 . In this case, a husband and wife brought an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, complaining of the husband's employment termination. They alleged causes of action against his employer under various theories of tort and contract, as well as violations of state and federal age discrimination laws. Relying on the plaintiffs' federal age discrimination claim, the defendant removed the action to federal court. After discovery disclosed that the husband had never filed an age discrimination charge with a federal or state agency, a prerequisite for suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § § 626(d), 633(b) (1982) , the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to delete the federal claim and to remand the remaining state law claims to state court. The district judge granted the motion. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted the defendant's petition for mandamus and directed the district court to vacate its remand order. The court sitting en banc, however, vacated the writ and reheard the case. By an equally divided vote, it denied the petition, providing a view in microcosm of the conflict concerning the power to remand that divides the courts of appeals. See infra note 74.
[Vol. 136:583 well as issues involving the separation of powers under the Constitution. Part III examines the history of removal statutes to argue that Congress's purpose in enacting removal statutes does not limit a federal court from exercising its common law authority over incidental claims. Finally, Part IV argues that a federal court's common law authority includes the power to remand and that the justifications for incidental jurisdiction-judicial economy, efficiency, and fairness to litigants-support discretionary remand of state law claims in certain cases.
I. THE SCOPE OF REMOVAL JURISDICTION
Determining whether a federal court has removal jurisdiction over a simple case that contains a single claim is a relatively straightforward matter. Either the case comes within the limits of article III and the accompanying jurisdictional statutes or it does not. With modern developments in procedural rules, however, the scope of cases for which removal is sought has greatly expanded. This Part examines the conflict between the statute that provides for limited removal jurisdiction and a federal court's power to hear cases removed from state court that include claims both within and without those limits.
A. The Statutory Bases for Removal
The Constitution makes no mention of removal, nor was the procedure known at common law; 1 5 yet, statutes have provided for removal jurisdiction since Congress first established lower federal courts. 6 The constitutionality of removal has long been settled. 17 The Judiciary Act of 178918 provided a right to remove to nonresident defendants in diversity actions and to a party in a land title suit who claimed title under a grant from a state other than that in which the suit was pending. 9 Since the first version of § 1331 was enacted the statutory phrase 'arising under . . . ' has resisted all attempts to frame a single, precise definition for determining which cases fall within, and which cases fall outside, the original jurisdiction of the district courts. Especially when considered in light of § 1441's removal jurisdiction, the phrase "arising under" masks a welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal judicial system. Franchise Tax Id. In Hum, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin performance of a play called "The Spider," alleging that it infringed upon their copyrighted play, "The Evil Hour." Plaintiffs also alleged that performance of "The Spider" constituted unfair competition under state law with respect to both the copyrighted version and a revised uncopyrighted version of "The Evil Hour." The Court held that there was judicial power to determine the unfair competition claim with respect to the copyrighted version of the plaintiffs' play but not as to the uncopyrighted version: "The bill . . . sets forth facts alleged to be in violation of two distinct rights, namely, the right to the protection of the copyrighted play, and the right to the protection of the uncopyrighted play. A cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right which the facts show. The number and variety of the facts alleged do not establish more than one cause of action so long as their result, whether they be considered severally or in combination, is the violation of but one right by a single legal wrong.
Baltimore S.S. Co., 274 U.S. at 321, quoted in Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 723. Commenting on Hurns's citation of Baltimore S.S. Co., the Court stated "that the weighty policies of judicial economy and fairness to parties reflected in the res judicata doctrine were in themselves strong counsel for the adoption of a rule which would permit federal courts to dispose of the state as well as the federal claims." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724. For discussion of the claim preclusive implications of incidental jurisdiction, se Jurisdiction Primer, supra note 9, at 111-14 & n.40. Beyond this constitutional minimum, there must be an examination of the posture in which the nonfederal claim is asserted and of the specific statute that confers jurisdiction over the federal claim, in order to determine whether 'Congress in [that statute] has .. .expressly or by implication negated' the exercise of jurisdiction over the particular nonfederal claim. 59 See Jurisdiction Primer, supra note 9, at 167.
Id. at 373 (quoting

Congress."60
Cases defining incidental jurisdiction-Gibbs, Aldinger, and Kroger-have addressed the threshold question of incidental jurisdiction: whether a federal court in its original jurisdiction initially has power to hear a state law claim. This issue is ordinarily resolved on the pleadings. 61 Federal court jurisdiction over an incidental claim, however, is not a party's right. 2 After a district court determines that a claim is within its constitutional power and that jurisdiction over that claim is not limited by any statute, whether the court will hear and decide the claim is within the judge's discretion. 6 3 The Supreme Court instructs the judge to consider "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants .... "64 If the federal claim is insubstantial or is dismissed before trial, the court ordinarily should dismiss the state law claims without prejudice. 65 Considerations of federalism and comity should also guide the district judge's discretion. To avoid unnecessary adjudications of state law, federal courts should defer to the state courts' competence to decide questions of state law.
66
With a properly removed case that contains only incidental claims, however, the court must address its power to dispose of a state law claim already within its jurisdiction. Although the court would have judicial power to decide a remaining incidental claim, 6 7 it would, for the reasons enunciated in Gibbs," 8 most likely exercise its discretion not 60 See id. The commentator continues:
All federal jurisdiction is subject both to constitutional and congressional jurisdictional grants. For a court to ignore congressional intent is inconsistent with our governmental system, which separates legislative and judicial power. Congress is the branch that controls the jurisdiction of such courts. Hence, even in Gibbs-type cases, courts must search for congressional intent.
Id. at 167-68.
61 See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727. In the context of removal, this issue is resolved at the time the defendant petitions the district court for removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (1982) (petition shall contain "a short and plain statement of the facts which entitle him . . .to removal together with a copy of all process, pleadings and orders served upon him . . . in such action"). es In the context of original jurisdiction, the Court in Gibbs described the constancy of a court's discretion over incidental claims:
The question of power will ordinarily be resolved on the pleadings. to hear the claim. Before the court can exercise its discretion and remand the case, however, it must determine the scope of section 1447(c). 69 Because the exercise of incidental jurisdiction is limited by both article III and statutes, the court must decide whether section 1447(c) limits its power to remand.
C. The Conflict over the Power to Remand a Properly Removed Case
Although the Supreme Court has not precisely defined the district courts' power to remand a properly removed case, the Court has had opportunity, by way of petitions for mandamus, to police the exercise of the district courts' power to remand. In Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 0 the Court determined that mandamus should lie to compel the district judge not to remand a case properly removed to his court. 1 The judge acknowledged that his reason for remanding was not one stated in the statute but determined that he had the discretion to remand the case to state court. His stated reason was that the district court's crowded docket would deny plaintiff speedy relief; litigation in state court would be faster.
7 2 The Supreme Court intervened: "Because the District Judge remanded a properly removed case on grounds that he had no authority to consider, he exceeded his statutorily defined power; and issuance of the writ of mandamus was not barred by § 1447(d)." 73 The courts of appeals have divided in interpreting Thermtron. the trial itself may reveal a substantial hegemony of state law claims, or likelihood of jury confusion, which could not have been anticipated at the pleading stage. Although it will of course be appropriate to take account in this circumstance of the already completed course of the litigation, dismissal of the state claim might even then be merited. For example, it may appear that the plaintiff was well aware of the nature of his proofs and the relative importance of his claims; recognition of a federal court's wide latitude to decide ancillary questions of state law does not imply that it must tolerate a litigant's effort to impose upon it what is in effect only a state case. Once it appears that a state claim constitutes the real body of a case, to which the federal claim is only an appendage, the state claim may fairly be dismissed. Some courts have reasoned that the "ground he had no authority to consider" language 7 5 in the first clause of its holding relates to the specific facts of Thermtron. 76 The district judge's action was egregious, and mandamus should have issued in that case. But, these courts continue, the second clause does not foreclose the existence of authority to remand on other grounds not mentioned in the statute.7 7 A court with power to hear state law claims may dismiss them in the exercise of its discretion. In the removal context, this view concludes, a district court likewise has authority to remand state law claims. Other courts have given broad scope to Thermtron, reading the grant of the writ of mandamus in that case as a prohibition against all discretionary remands.
7 ' These courts found an inconsistency between Cir. 1978 ) (mandamus appropriate when a "district court enters a remand order that is not only erroneous but also states that it is based on nonstatutory grounds"). The Fifth Circuit, however, has reversed its course. See IMFC Professional Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Latin Am. Home Health, Inc., 676 F.2d 152, 160 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (A district court has "independent authority for a discretion to remand [which is derived] from the nature of the ancillary jurisdiction created by § 1442(a)(1).").
Other circuits hold that incidental jurisdiction provides legitimate authority on which to ground a decision to remand. [Vol. 136:583 the power to remand for reasons not specified in the statute and the "fundamental constitutional principle that the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts is dependent on specific statutory authorization." 8 0 According to this view, the established rule that removal statutes should be strictly construed 8 " does not permit remand on nonstatutory grounds. The removal statutes direct when a district judge "shall" remand a case 82 and when in her discretion she "may" remand a case. 83 Those who invoke the "fundamental constitutional principle" argue that this statutory scheme forecloses exercising discretion not authorized by statute. 84 
II. THE POWER TO DECLINE VESTED JURISDICTION AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
To those who read the holding in Thermtron Products v. Hermansdorfer 85 broadly, discretionary remand of a properly removed case violates the separation of powers. 8 6 Proponents of this view argue that, after a case has been removed to federal court, the power to remand is dependent on the specific terms of section 1447(c). 8 7 A judge who remands a case for reasons not mentioned in that provision-even a case that in its present posture contains only state law Sept. 24, 1986) 1984) . For further discussion, see infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text. At this stage of the analysis, however, the issue is whether a district court has the power to remand properly removed cases at all, not whether the availability of remand would be more fair to plaintiffs whose state law claims would otherwise be barred by the running of the statute of limitations.
claims-confronts the assertion that lower federal courts are dutybound to hear cases within their statutorily-conferred power." 8
A. Analogy to Abstention
Federal courts often decline to exercise jurisdiction over cases within their power, despite statements of countervailing duty, by invoking the doctrine of abstention. Abstention is a collection of judiciallydeveloped doctrines," 9 some of which require 9 " and others of which counsel 91 that federal courts defer to pending or potential state court proceedings. Abstention results either in a stay 92 or dismissal 9 3 of the federal actions. To counter objections based on the duty to exercise vested jurisdiction, judges have developed rationales to justify the doctrine similar to those developed for declining incidental jurisdiction: considerations of federalism, comity, and judicial efficiency. 94 The prac- tice of abstention lends legitimacy to judges who claim common law power to remand a properly removed case containing only incidental claims. 95 Moreover, both abstention and the common law power to remand raise issues of jurisdiction, the discretion to decline its exercise, and the legitimate use of judicial power.
The Strict Separation of Powers Critique
In a recent sweeping attack upon the legitimacy of abstention, Professor Martin Redish argues that the doctrine violates the separation of powersY 6 Both critics of the doctrine and those who favor it, he contends, are focusing on the wrong branch of government: the judiciary. Supporters of abstention argue that the doctrine promotes a wiser balance of judicial federalism; 9 7 opponents seek to show the superiority of federal courts over state courts as enforcers of federal rights. 9 " To Redish, the arguments should be directed not to the judicial forum but to the legislative arena: "Judge-made abstention constitutes judicial jurisdiction in deference to the expertise of a special administrative body whose remedies are still available. See, e.g., United States v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 69 (1956) (deferring to the Interstate Commerce Commission's determination of the rights of the parties).
91 One federal appellate court, in remanding a properly removed incidental claim after federal law claims had been dismissed, invoked the legitimacy of abstention as a possible source of the court's authority to remand. This court did not develop this analysis because it found that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction afforded ample authority. Under a separation of powers analysis, the issue is not the desirability of a certain judicial decision to abstain, but whether the judiciary has the power to decline jurisdiction in the first place. 10 0 Congress has the authority both to make the basic policy decisions concerning how the nation is to be governed and to employ the federal judiciary to enforce the statutory programs it adopts. 1 ' Absent a finding of unconstitutionality, the judiciary cannot modify or repeal jurisdictional enforcement mechanisms unless Congress has clearly delegated such authority to it.' 2 "Congress has retained for itself," Redish concludes, "the authority to decide when federal courts should decline to exercise their jurisdiction."o 3
The Jurisdiction and Discretion Approach
In direct response to Professor Redish's rigorous separation of powers approach, Professor David Shapiro argues that judicial abstention in matters of jurisdiction has "ancient and honorable roots at common law as well as in equity."' 0 4 To Shapiro, "reasoned discretion" is not only "consistent with the Anglo-American legal tradition" but also "has much to contribute to the easing of interbranch and intergovernmental tensions in our complex system of government."' 0 5 The discretion not to proceed with a case is part of the dynamic operating between legislative and judicial branches.
Shapiro interprets jurisdictional directives as empowering a federal court with a "principle of preference," a presumption that it should decide an action within the scope of the jurisdictional grant.' 0 6 This "' Redish, supra note 96, at 114. Redish contrasts judge-made abstention with "statutorily dictated federal court abstention," id. at 81, the network of statutes that limit the exercise of federal court power to disrupt state proceedings or interfere unduly with state policies: the Tax 100 "If Congress intended that the federal courts exercise a particular jurisdiction, either to achieve substantive legislative ends or to provide a constitutionally-contemplated jurisdictional advantage, a court may not, absent constitutional objections, repeal those jurisdictional grants." Redish, supra note 96, at 77.
101 See id. at 115. "In either repealing or modifying the legislation, the court would be altering a legislative scheme because of disagreement with the social policy choices that the scheme manifests." Id. at 77.
102 See id. at 115.
principle of preference, however, will yield when the court determines that it should not proceed because of factors legitimately within the judiciary's power to consider. 0 7 The traditional grounds for denying equitable relief provide a prime example of a federal court's inherent discretion not to proceed with certain cases within its jurisdiction.' The principle of preference can yield to nonlegislative determinations of justiciability' 0 9 -standing, ripeness, and mootness. It can likewise yield to the judicial determination to dismiss a case for forum non conveniens."° Judicial discretion is also involved in determining the scope of incidental jurisdiction."' Discretion in matters of jurisdiction, for Shapiro, is not an element of any congressional grant of jurisdiction, but a function of the need for case-by-case refinement of broad statutory provisions." 2 Moreover, courts are especially concerned with questions of jurisdiction "because they intimately affect the courts' relations with each other as well as with the other branches of government."" ' Thus, Shapiro concludes, the exercise of discretion to decline jurisdiction actually protects the 107 Id. at 547, 575 (examples of factors noted by Shapiro include "traditional equitable principles," "principles of federalism," and "principles of separation of powers"). 110 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) ("The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute."). Judicial authority to dismiss an action on grounds of forum non conveniens is similar to the authority some courts claim in order to remand a properly removed case. In both situations, although the case meet is the provisions of the statute, the court may decide that it is not the appropriate forum in which to hear the case. Of course, in forum non conveniens cases, the statutory provision not exercised concerns venue, not jurisdiction.
"I See Shapiro, supra note 97, at 555-57. 112 See id. at 574 ("[T]he question whether a court must exercise jurisdiction and resolve a controversy on its merits is difficult, if not impossible, to answer in gross. And the courts are functionally better adapted to engage in the necessary fine tuning than is the legislature.").
11
Id.
separation of powers.""
Under this analysis of discretion, certain judicially-developed reasons to decline jurisdiction are legitimate and do not violate the separation of powers. Yet this discretion has limits. In order for the principle of preference to yield in a particular case, the court must provide an explanation for declining legislatively-granted jurisdiction that is based on the historical context in which the grant was made or the common law tradition behind it.1 15 B. Declining Incidental Jurisdiction and the Limits of Section 1447(c)
The Strict Separation of Powers Approach
Promoters of the broad interpretation of Thermtron can find support in Professor Redish's rigorous separation of powers approach. Congress passed the removal statutes as part of the enforcement scheme for its statutory programs. Providing for removal jurisdiction indicates Congress's policy determination that defendants can choose to litigate certain cases in a federal forum, as opposed to a state forum. If under section 1441(b)". 6 a defendant can properly remove a case containing both state law and federal law claims, then the district court to which such a case is removed cannot remand it. Unless dismissed, the court is dutybound to hear and decide the entire case.
Furthermore, under this broad interpretation, remand statutes specifically indicate when judges can deny a federal forum to state court litigants. The specificity of Congress's provisions for remand belies any notion that Congress has delegated to the judiciary the authority to decide when to remand properly removed cases. ' Discretionary remand of any properly removed case would counter congressional intent as expressed in section 1447(c)."' Although it is contrary to judicial con- 
-his crowded docket-provides an example of jurisdictional discretion that cannot be supported by legits predecessor statutes, which grant district courts the power to remand incidental claims after removal).
119 Under Redish's approach, only if a removal provision were unconstitutional could the judiciary deny the will of Congress. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. The constitutionality of removal jurisdiction is settled. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 120 The American Law Institute has proposed an amendment to the remand statute that would grant district courts the power to remand incidental claims:
In any case removed to a district court of the United States . . . in which claims arising under State law remain pending after disposition of the federal claim, defense, or counterclaim that is the basis for jurisdiction, the district court shall have discretion either to adjudicate the remaining State claims, or, if it finds that determination of such claims in a State court is in the interest of justice and not prejudicial to the parties, to remand the case to the State court. 121 This principle is inferred from the statute's command that cases removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction" shall be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982). islative history. 22 Under Shapiro's case-by-case approach to interpreting jurisdictional grants, however, the determination that the district judge in Thermtron had violated the statute is limited to the facts of that case. Whether remanding a different case-one under section 1441(b) that in its present posture contains only state law claims-would violate section 1447(c) requires further inquiry into the history of the removal and remand statutes.
C. Recognizing the Judiciary's Common Law Authority over Incidental Jurisdiction
The separation of powers principle in this context concerns judicial intrusion into the lawmaking function of Congress. Confronted with a properly removed case containing only state law claims, the question is whether a court encroaches upon Congress's power to control what happens to a case after removal by remanding. Under Professor Redish's approach, the inference can be made from section 1447(c) that the statute prohibits the remand of any properly removed case. The court that remands imposes its own determination about what should happen to a case after proper removal. As with abstention, such an exercise of discretion conflicts with statutory command.
This view of jurisdictional authority based strictly on statute fails to account for a federal court's common law authority over incidental claims. A court determining whether it has jurisdiction to hear an incidental claim along with a federal law claim first decides whether the state law claim is within the court's "constitutional power." If the federal law claim is substantial and the claims derive from a "common nucleus of operative fact," then the incidental claim has crossed the "first hurdle." 12 A court must then determine whether any statute limits its discretionary exercise of incidental jurisdiction. 124 This inquiry, however, does not assume that a jurisdictional statute restrictively defines all permissible exercises of judicial power.
With its emphasis on judicial discretion, Professor Shapiro's approach better accommodates questions involving incidental jurisdiction than does the strict statutory approach. Shapiro would examine the historical context in which Congress enacted section 1447(c) to determine whether an exercise of jurisdictional discretion is compatible with the 122 The Supreme Court commented: "That justice may move more slowly in some federal courts than in their state counterparts is not one of the considerations that Congress has permitted the district courts to recognize in passing on remand issues." Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 351. 
III. CONGRESS'S PURPOSE IN ENACTING REMOVAL JURISDICTION
This Part examines whether Congress, in granting removal jurisdiction, conferred on defendants a right to have the incidental claims of a case removed from state court decided in federal court. Specifically, it examines the removal statutes enacted between 1866 and 1887 to determine whether Congress intended the predecessor to section 1447(c), 2 5 originally enacted in 1887,26 to prevent the remand of incidental claims. More generally, it asks whether Congress intended a federal court to treat incidental claims differently in its removal jurisdiction than in its original jurisdiction.
By enacting section 1331,127 Congress did not confer on litigants a right to have incidental claims heard in federal court. 2 Because Congress employed similar language in sections 1331 and 1441(a) 29 to confer on federal courts the power to hear cases "arising under" federal law, courts explicitly tie the scope of removal jurisdiction to the scope of original jurisdiction. 1 0 This relationship leads some courts to dispose of a case under section 1441(a) that contains only state law claims in the same fashion that it would dispose of a similar case under section 1331.31 In neither context, the argument runs, would a federal court decide the case. It would either be dismissed or remanded.
Removal jurisdiction, however, serves a different purpose than does original jurisdiction. Congress granted removal jurisdiction in order to provide a defendant in state court the right to litigate in a federal 121 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982 This quest for congressional intent is largely a quest for implied intent. Congress has expressed its views on the propriety of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction only infrequently. Thus, the major problem for courts applying Aldinger and Kroger is discovering when implied congressional intent creates a jurisdictional limitation. Courts must ask a most imponderable question: what would Congress think about an issue to which it has given no express thought?
Jurisdiction Primer, supra note 9, at 168 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1982)); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
A. Removal Jurisdiction and Incidental Claims Between the Civil War and 1887
Although Congress has remained silent on the issues of incidental claims and general federal question jurisdiction, both original and removal, it has addressed the issue of incidental claims and diversity jurisdiction in the removal context. The series of diversity removal statutes that Congress passed between the Civil War and 1887 reveal a general policy regarding federal court adjudication of incidental claims in removed cases. These statutes, especially the predecessors of section 1441(c), demonstrate Congress's intent not to confer on state court defendants the right to have incidental claims adjudicated by a federal court after removal. Furthermore, they provide positive evidence of what Congress might have done had it addressed the issue of federal question jurisdiction and incidental claims in the removal context.
Removal Jurisdiction Through 1875
Congress passed two statutes soon after the end of the Civil War that foreshadowed the great expansion of federal power in the Judici- [11f the suit is one in which there can be a final determination of the controversy, so far as it concerns him, without the presence of the other defendants as parties in the cause, then and in every such case the alien defendant, or the defendant who is a citizen of a State other than that in which the suit is brought, may, at any time before the trial or final hearing of the cause, file a petition for the removal of the cause .. Id., 14 Stat. at 306-07.
'"
The statute states:
[Sluch removal of the cause, as against the defendant petitioning therefor, into the United States court, shall not be deemed to prejudice or take away the right of the plaintiff to proceed at the same time with the suit in the state court as against the other defendants, if he shall desire to do so. Congress reversed Sewing Machine by enacting the Judiciary Act of 1875. Congress combined the "separable controversy" element of the 1866 Act with the right of either party to remove granted by the Prejudice or Local Influence Act. The 1875 Act permitted both plaintiffs and defendants to remove an entire suit from state court if the real controversy was between diverse parties. 1 5 Like the 1867 Act, the legislation did not include the language from the 1866 Act concerning the right of a plaintiff to continue litigating in state court against nondiverse defendants." 4 The 1875 Act, therefore, granted federal courts removal jurisdiction to adjudicate incidental claims-claims between nondiverse parties joined with claims that satisfied the complete diversity requirement.' 5 5 In contrast, a case containing claims between diverse parties joined with claims between nondiverse parties could not have been brought in federal court originally. No provision in the 1875 Act governing original diversity jurisdiction changed the statutory requirement of complete diversity. That removal jurisdiction after 1875 extended to claims that could not have been brought in federal court originally should not be interpreted to mean that Congress intended courts to treat incidental claims differently in its removal jurisdiction than in its original jurisdiction. The 1875 Act also granted the federal courts power to determine whether any suit in federal court "at any time after such suit has been brought or removed thereto . . . does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of [the] court" and to "dismiss the suit or remand it . . .as justice may require ... ." Congress clearly contemplated that a federal court's power to dispose of a case not substantially federal in character was to be the same in its original or removal jurisdictions.
Congress's effort to expand federal judicial power with the 1875 Act extended beyond diversity jurisdiction. This statute granted federal courts, for the first significant period of time, original and removal jurisdiction over all questions "arising under" federal law.
15 7 Because Congress chose to enact general federal question jurisdiction with the same "arising under" language contained in article III, the 1875 Act might be read to grant federal courts all the jurisdiction constitutionally permissible.
1 58 Judicial interpretations of the 1875 Act, however, read ... Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472 (emphasis added). This provision is critical because it demonstrates that Congress, even as it granted the broadest federal jurisdiction in history, intended a federal court to have power to remand a case that was not of substantial federal character. It states in full:
That if, in any suit commenced in a circuit court or removed from a State court to a circuit of the United States, it shall appear to the satisfaction of said circuit court, at any time after such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that the parties to said suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under this act, the said circuit court shall proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit or remand it to the court from which it was removed as justice may require .. .but the order of said circuit dismissing or remanding said cause to the State court shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court on writ of error or appeal, as the case may be. [Vol. 136:583 its language more narrowly than that of the Constitution."'
In legislating broad national judicial power, Congress displayed its distrust of the justice available in state courts. From one perspective, the 1875 Act was the culmination of Reconstruction. Southern defiance of national policy had led Congress to redefine federalism to assert national authority over the South.'" 0 From another perspective, the 1875 "" Judicial construction of the Act introduced requirements that limited the scope of federal question jurisdiction. The first appearance of the substantiality doctrine-making the presence of a substantial federal question a prerequisite to lower federal court jurisdiction-was in Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877). See "One Constitutional Case," supra note 9, at 1433 (arguing that the origin of the substantial federal question test is statutory and not constitutional); supra note 43 (discussing the substantiality component of federal question incidental jurisdiction). In Gold-Washing, the Court held that, before federal question jurisdiction can attach, a court must find "that the suit is one which 'really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy' as to a right which depends upon the construction or effect of the Constitution, or some law or treaty of the United States." Gold-Washing, 96 U.S. at 203-04. Although the Court did not explicitly state the source of the substantiality requirement, the 1875 Act contained the language "really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy. .") ; id. at 469 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the opinion of the Court was an "erroneous interpretation of the statute" and that it was "too narrow"); see also supra note 120 (discussing the ALI's proposed amendment to the removal statute that would permit removal upon defendant's pleading of a federal defense).
160 See S. KUTLER, supra note 19, at 145-46; Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 333, 338-42 (1969) . The passage of civil rights statutes to enforce the federally-guaranteed rights of the thir-Act demonstrated Congress's concern for the needs of the national business enterprises that emerged during this period."' 1 Some commentators have suggested that the real purpose behind the 1875 Act was to remedy the increasing number of attacks on railroad interests in state courts.' 6 2 Whatever the mix of motives, Congress in 1875 struck a fundamentally new balance between state and federal courts. Even at this high point of federal jurisdiction, however, a litigant who removed a case to federal court could not claim a right to have incidental claims decided there.
The Judiciary Act of 1887
By 1887, the nationalism of Reconstruction had completely receded, although railroads were still frequent defendants in state court suits."1 Congress reversed its course and restricted access to federal court with the Judiciary Act of 1887.14 The Act limited the availability of removal to state court defendants and raised the amount in controversy requirement from $500 to $2000. 165 The 1887 Act did, however, retain elements of the federal jurisdictional expansion of the post-Civil War period. It retained the "separable controversy" provision that had first appeared in the 1866 Act, including the expanded coverage of incidental claims that the 1875 Act had established. Although the 1887 provision was limited to defendants, a litigant who had a separable controversy against a plaintiff of diverse citizenship could remove the entire case. 166 Under both the 1875 and 1887 Acts, a federal court had power to decide incidental claims.
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Congress reemployed the "prejudice or local influence" provision of the 1867 Act that had been deleted from the broad language of the 1875 Act 6 ' but added a new and significant proviso. After establishing that local bias would prevent justice in state court, a defendant could remove the entire suit to federal court. If, however, the court determined that the bias did not pertain to other defendants, it could in its discretion remand that part of the case concerning those defendants." 6 Furthermore, the statute directed the court to "examine into the truth 166 The 1887 Act did not reinstate the provision from the 1866 Act that had permitted a plaintiff to proceed against nondiverse defendants in state court after defendants of diverse citizenship had removed.
167 As has been noted, the "separable controversy" provision that originated in the 1866 Act, see supra note 141 and accompanying text, was the predecessor to § 1441(c). (questioning the constitutionality of removing a "separate and independent" claim along with an otherwise removable federal question).
166 This provision remained in the removal statute until the 1948 revision to the judicial code. The Reviser's Notes to the 1948 revision explained why Congress discarded the "prejudice or local influence" language:
These provisions, born of the bitter sectional feeling engendered by the Civil War and the Reconstruction period, have no place in the jurisprudence of a nation since united by three wars against foreign powers. Indeed, the practice of removal for prejudice or local influence has not been employed much in recent years.
Reviser's Notes, supra note 26, at 5. After the 1948 revision, therefore, any argument that Congress granted defendants the right to have state law claims of a case removed from state court adjudicated along with federal law claims by a federal court in order to avoid the bias of state court is untenable.
16' The Judiciary Act of 1888 provided:
[Ilf it further appear that said suit can be fully and justly determined as to the other defendants in the State court, without being affected by such prejudice or local influence, and that no party to the suit will be prejudiced by a separation of the parties, said circuit court may direct the suit to be remanded, so far as relates to such other defendants ...
Id., 25 Stat. at 435.
of said affidavit . . . and, unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of said court that said party will not be able to obtain justice in such State court, it shall cause the same to be remanded thereto."' 1 7 0 By couching broad discretion in obligatory language, Congress in effect created a scheme whereby the judiciary did not have to hear any cases removed under the prejudice or local influence provision. Finally, the 1887 Act included a provision that directed a federal court to remand any "improperly removed" case. 171 Congress directed that remands be "immediately carried into execution" and forbade appellate review, either by appeal or extraordinary writ. The second remand provision in the 1887 statute-mandating that a case found to be improperly removed be remanded-marks the first 170 
Id. (emphasis added).
171 This statute marks the first appearance of the provision that is currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and (d):
Whenever any cause shall be removed from any State court into any circuit court of the United States, and the circuit court shall decide that the cause was improperly removed, and order the same to be remanded to the State court from whence it came, such remand shall be immediately carried into execution, and no appeal or writ of error . . . shall be allowed. Congress directed that cases improperly removed be remanded in order to ensure that only cases substantially within the limited jurisdiction of federal courts could properly be removed. The provision should not be interpreted as limiting remand to cases improperly removed in order to preserve a defendant's right to have properly removed incidental claims adjudicated in federal court. Indeed, a district judge confronted with a properly removed case under the 1887 Act that, after federal law claims had been dismissed, contained only incidental claims might well have decided that the case had become "improperly removed. 177 Not only does the language of the Act of 1887 evidence the Congressional purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts on removal, but the policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is one calling for the strict construction of such legislation. The power reserved to the states under the Constitution to provide for the determination of controversies in their courts, may be restricted only by the action of Congress in conformity to the Judiciary Articles of the Constitution. "Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined." Id. at 108-09 (citations omitted).
177 There is a similar modern response to the conclusion that § 1447(c) forbids the remand of any properly removed case. Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the relation back of amendments to the time of the pleading. An amendment deleting all federal claims would arise out of the "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" set forth in the original pleading. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c). As a result of the legal fiction of an amendment relating back to the pleadings, no federal claims would appear on the face of the pleading at the time of removal. The removal to federal court would thus have been "without jurisdiction," § 1447(c), and the court would be obliged to remand the case. See id.
A rejoinder to this argument, albeit a formalistic one, is to point to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (1982) , under which the defendant might then be liable to "pay all costs and disbursements incurred by reason of the removal proceedings should it be determined that the case was not removable or was improperly removed." Ultimately, the most probative evidence of the intended scope of section 1447(c) is found in the history of section 1441(c). 18 ' In defining federal jurisdiction over incidental claims in the diversity context, Congress has consistently stated that a federal court, in its discretion, may remand incidental state law claims. This discretion was provided even in 1875, when Congress implemented the broadest federal jurisdictional scheme in history. 18 2 Had Congress ever addressed the problem of federal question jurisdiction and incidental claims in the removal context, section 1441(c) strongly suggests that Congress would have similarly provided district courts the power to remand, in their discretion, state law claims incidental to federal questions.
IV. A FEDERAL COURT'S COMMON LAW AUTHORITY INCLUDES THE POWER TO REMAND
The Supreme Court, ruling on a petition for mandamus, will decide whether a federal court has power to remand a properly removed case that in its present posture contains only incidental claims. In so ruling, this Comment argues that the Court will determine whether section 1447(c) I 83 limits the exercise of common law jurisdiction over incidental claims removed from state court." 4 This Part first examines the posture in which this issue is presented and the significance of it being decided on a petition for mandamus. It concludes that, because section 1447(c) does not govern the remand of incidental claims, the extraordinary remedy of mandamus should not lie to compel a district court to exercise its remand power by the terms of the statute. It then looks to some issues involved in exercising judicial discretion over incidental claims in the removal context. court to which the cause is removed. This was accomplished by denying any form of review of an order of remand . In Thermtron, however, the Court reasoned that mandamus was not barred because sections 1447(c) and 1447(d) were to be construed together.
18 7 Thus, the prohibition of appellate review in section 1447(d) operates only when the stated reason for remand is that the case was "removed improvidently and without jurisdiction."' 8 8 Because the district judge in Thermtron remanded for reasons not stated in section 1447(c), the bar of section 1447(d) had no effect.' 8 9 Mandamus would lie "to prevent nullification of the removal statutes by remand orders resting on grounds having no warrant in the law."' 90 To those who view the jurisdictional authority of lower federal courts as based strictly on statute, the Thermtron Court's interpretation of section 1447(c) expanded the scope of a federal court's duty under the removal and remand statutes. Because proper removal under section 1441(b) 1 ' vests jurisdiction over both the federal and incidental claims of a case, they reason, section 1447(c) controls the disposition of a properly removed case's incidental claims. Discretionary remand, even of a case that contains only an incidental claim, violates section 1447(c). Mandamus, therefore, should compel the district court to vacate its remand order. This reasoning not only confuses statutorily-defined jurisdiction with a court's residual power under article III to dispose of incidental claims, but it also fails to account for the traditional standard for granting petitions for mandamus and the extraordinary reasons why that standard was met in Thermtron. 185 
1987]
The Standard for Granting a Writ of Mandamus
Traditionally, the writ of mandamus has been used in the federal courts "to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so." ' ' 12 Mandamus is granted only in extraordinary situations. The Supreme Court has stated that "only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial 'usurpation of power' will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy."' 9 3 The writ, for example, has been invoked when a district judge abused his discretion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by repeatedly referring cases to a master improperly.' Finally, the party seeking mandamus has "the burden of showing that its right to issuance of the writ is 'clear and indisputable.' -195
Applying the Standard to Remand Orders
In Thermtron, the statutory requirements for subject matter jurisdiction had been met: the parties were citizens of different states, and the claim exceeded $10,000. The district judge had no authority to consider whether, because of his crowded docket, state court would be a better forum for the case. Nor could the judge claim that his reason for remanding was within the court's residual power to fashion common law exceptions. 9 The district judge's order to remand exceeded the (1982) . In In re Winn, 213 U.S. 458 (1909), the Supreme Court responded to an argument "that mandamus will not lie to control the judgment or judicial discretion of the court to which the writ is proposed to be directed" by stating that the assertion was "true where the judgment or judicial discretion is within the limits of jurisdiction, but not otherwise. court's statutorily-defined power. The defendant's right to have a federal court adjudicate the case after removal was "clear and indisputable." Mandamus was an appropriate remedy to enforce this right.
Properly removed incidental claims present an altogether different situation. Even if one subscribes to the broad interpretation of Thermtron and concludes that the remand of any properly removed case violates a strict reading of section 1447(c), it is questionable whether the remand of a case that contains only an incidental claim gives rise to a "judicial 'usurpation of power.' """ The duty of a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over such a case should hardly be considered "clear and indisputable." Absent diversity of citizenship, a federal court should have virtually no interest in a case that contains only a state law claim." 9 8 But the petition for mandamus in this situation should be denied, however, not only because of the extraordinary nature of the remedy. Mandamus should not lie because a judge's discretionary remand of an incidental claim does not violate section 1447(c).
Only if Congress intended section 1447(c) to forbid the remand of any case properly within a court's removal jurisdiction would the remand of a properly removed case that in its present posture contains only an incidental claim would violate the statute. Although this interpretation can be inferred from the provision that cases "without jurisdiction" shall be remanded, the history of removal jurisdiction indicates that the only cases that Congress intended to protect from remand were those that fell within the federal courts' limited statutory jurisdiction. Any claimed right to have an incidental claim adjudicated after removal is untenable. Moreover, evidence of the scope that Congress intended section 1447(c) to have is its treatment of incidental claims "seperable" from federally cognizable claims under the predecessors of section 1441(c). Under these provisions, a federal court, in the exercise of its discretion, could remand the incidental claims of a properly removed case. Finally, Congress first enacted the predecessor to section 1447(c) as part of a statute the purpose of which was to limit the removal jurisdiction of federal courts. It strains the imagination to conclude that Congress in 1887 implicitly intended the new remand provision of a jurisdictional statute, which otherwise limited the availability of the federal courts, to protect a properly removed indicental claim from remand. Section 1447(c) should not be interpreted to govern a court's power to remand incidental claims.
An order remanding a properly removed incidental claim, like the order in Thermtron, is made for reasons not stated in section 1447(c).
Appellate review of such an order, therefore, is not barred by section 1447(d). An order remanding incidental claims, however, in contrast to the order in Thermtron, rests on legitimate grounds. Mandamus was appropriate in Thermtron because the judge had no authority to consider his crowded docket in deciding whether to remand. But because section 1447(c) does not "'expressly or by implication negate[]' the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonfederal claim," ' under the authority defined in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 200 the court can exercise its incidental jurisdiction and, in its discretion, remand a properly removed case that contains only an incidental claim.
B. The Justifications for Incidental Jurisdiction Support Discretionary Remand of Incidental Claims in Certain Cases
Gibbs identifies when a federal court may properly exercise its common law power under article III to adjudicate state law claims. "[C]onsiderations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" justify a federal court's incidental jurisdiction over state law claims. 201 The first two factors relate to the exercise of incidental jurisdiction in the removal context as much as they relate to incidental jurisdiction in other contexts. Incidental jurisdiction saves the collective judicial resources of state and federal court systems from duplicative litigation. 2 2 A federal court's power to hear incidental claims in any jurisdictional setting ensures that litigants will not be dissuaded from pursuing federal law claims in federal court solely because a state court's general jurisdiction empowers it to hear state and federal claims together. Without incidental jurisdiction, the usefulness of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's liberal joinder provisions would be undercut. 0 3 A federal court exercising removal jurisdiction, however, must give special consideration to the third justification for incidental jurisdiction-fairness to litigants. Removal jurisdiction raises difficult issues of fairness that concern both plaintiffs and defendants.
Fairness to Plaintiffs: State Statutes of Limitations
When a federal court exercising original jurisdiction decides not hear an incidental claim, Gibbs instructs the court to dismiss the claim without prejudice. 2 0 4 Fairness to the plaintiff dictates that she be afforded a chance to relitigate the claim in state court. A federal court can be no more fair to such a plaintiff. When a plaintiff brings an action that contains both state law and federal law claims against the defendant, she controls the choice of forum. She bears the risk that the federal court will find her federal law claims to be insubstantial and dismiss the case. She also bears the risk that, after dismissal; the state law claims will be time barred in state court.
Considerations of fairness to the plaintiff are different when a federal court exercises removal jurisdiction. Here, the plaintiff has chosen to pursue her federal law and state law claims in state court. Once she pleads a federal law claim, she does not control whether the case will be litigated in federal court since the defendant will have the right to remove. If the defendant chooses to remove, it is possible, if not likely, that the case will remain pending in federal court after the statute of limitations for bringing the state law claim in state court has passed. 2 " 5 Assume that after removal the federal court dismisses the federal law claim and, exercising its discretion under Gibbs, decides not to hear the state law claim. A federal court without power to remand would dismiss the case without prejudice. If the plaintiff is from a state without a "saving statute, '206 she has lost the right to have her state law claim heard in any forum. Because the defendant controls access to federal court, this bar to relief seems more unfair than when the plaintiff initially chooses a federal forum for her case. Federal court power to remand in this situation would avoid this unfairness. After remand, irrespective of the state's statute of limitations, the state court would be able to hear the state law claim. 2. Fairness to Defendants: Avoiding Manipulation A federal court that considers fairness to the defendant will not always remand incidental claims after it dismisses all federal law claims. The rule in Gibbs that, after federal law claims are dismissed, incidental claims should "[c]ertainly" be dismissed as well, 20 8 should be somewhat modified in the context of removal jurisdiction. With removal, Congress has given a defendant the right to litigate her federal law claim in federal court. After defendant has invoked her right to remove, and the district court has exercised its discretion to hear the case's incidental claims, the court should be more willing to decide incidental claims than it would be in its original jurisdiction. A plaintiff should not be permitted to jockey the defendant back and forth between state and federal courts by deleting her federal law claims and moving Credit Plan Consumer Discount Co., 83 Lackawanna Jurist 221 (1982), plaintiff brought suit in state court after a timely federal suit had been dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania, interpreted the statute to allow "a plaintiff a one year period of time within which to recommence his suit in certain proceedings after a dismissal on grounds other than the merits of the case." Id. at 223. It stated further that "[it is the general rule that to fall within the scope of a saving statute, the second action must be based substantially on the same cause of action and must involve substantially the same parties." Id. The court held that, "although the federal and state causes of action arise out of the same transaction, the defendants in the two actions are entirely different," id., and, therefore, the statute did not apply. It appears, then, that the statute would apply when a timely federal suit had been dismissed without prejudice and, within one year, the plaintiff brought suit in state court against the same defendants for a claim arising out of the same transaction. 
CONCLUSION
Although a federal court exercising original jurisdiction ordinarily resolves the question of judicial power over an incidental claim on the pleadings, whether jurisdiction should be exercised is a question that remains open throughout the litigation. Nothing in the history of removal jurisdiction indicates, explicitly or implicitly, that Congress has ever intended a federal court to treat incidental claims differently after they are removed. In the few provisions that pertain to incidental claims, Congress has consistently stated that a federal court should exercise jurisdiction over an incidental claim in its discretion. In section 1441(c), 210 Congress states that a federal court may remand a properly removed incidental claim in its discretion. Although this provision historically pertained to diversity jurisdiction and incidental claims in the removal context, it most likely indicates what Congress would have done had it addressed the question of federal question jurisdiction and incidental claims in the removal context. Moreover, when Congress first enacted general federal question jurisdiction in 1875 21 -a statute that conferred the broadest federal jurisdiction in history-the removal provision directed that the propriety of federal jurisdiction was to be considered throughout the pendency of the suit, not just at the time of removal. When in 1887212 Congress provided that claims "without ju- 209 Cohill presents this issue. After defendants removed, there was extensive discovery, twice extended at plaintiff's request. Only then did plaintiffs discover that their federal law claim was legally defective and moved to remand. risdiction" shall be remanded, Congress was concerned only with protecting the limited federal subject matter jurisdiction defined by statute. Understood in this context, section 1447(c) *a3 should not be interpreted to limit a federal court's power to dispose of incidental claims. Because the statute does not limit a federal court's incidental jurisdiction, a court has common law power to remand. A court that exercises this power by remanding a case that in its present posture contains only a properly removed incidental claim does not violate the separation of powers under the constitution. Common law remand does not constitute impermissible lawmaking by-the judiciary. Although without jurisdictional statutes a lower federal court is powerless to hear cases, once Congress has conferred jurisdiction, a court has residual power under article III to define the scope of a case that the statute empowers it to hear. Just as the federal court in its original jurisdiction has power to dismiss an incidental claim, in its removal jurisdiction it has power to remand. How the power to remand an incidental claim is exercised should depend on the equities of each case, a determination properly left to the discretion of the court.
